Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 30
Issue 4 Summer 1999

Article 2

1999

A Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The
Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's Seclusion
James W. Hilliard
Illinois Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
James W. Hilliard, A Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's Seclusion, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L. J.
601 (1999).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol30/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

A Familiar Tort that May Not Exist in Illinois: The
Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's Seclusion
James W. Hilliard*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and her daughter were patrons at defendant's roller-skating
rink.' On one occasion, they used the women's restroom on the
premises that defendant provided for his patrons.2 Plaintiff then
discovered that defendant had installed see-through panels in the
restroom ceiling.3 These see-through panels permitted secret
observation from the ceiling, including observation of the restroom
stalls. 4 In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant had
personally watched her and her daughter using the restroom.5
In another case, plaintiff suffered from cancer of the larynx.6
Defendant was his physician and surgeon, who had twice operated on
plaintiff.7 During the course of treatment, many photographs of
plaintiff were taken by defendant or at defendant's direction.8 The
photos were seen only by defendant's staff and appropriate hospital
personnel and were used only for plaintiff's medical file.9 According
to defendant, plaintiff always consented to being photographed,
although there was no evidence of written consent. 10 However, on the
day plaintiff died, defendant or a nurse, at the defendant's direction,
photographed the dying plaintiff despite several indications that he did
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1980; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law,
1983. The author is currently serving as a judicial clerk to Chief Justice Charles
Freeman of the Illinois Supreme Court. The views expressed herein are those of the
author alone. The author is grateful for the insight of Cynthia Cobbs and Anthony
Swanagan and dedicates this article to the memory of his father, James D. Hilliard.
1. See Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1976).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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not want to be photographed."
In a similar case, plaintiffs were husband and wife who rented a
house from defendant. 2 Without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent,
defendant installed a hidden listening and recording device in their
bedroom near their bed.' 3 The wires from the eavesdropping device
ran to the adjacent building where defendant lived.'4
The court in each case held that plaintiff had stated a valid cause of
action for intrusion on seclusion. 5 The unreasonable intrusion on
another's seclusion is one of the four forms of the tort of "invasion of
privacy."' 6 The tort consists of "an intentional interference with
[another's] interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or
as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man."' 7
The great majority of American jurisdictions recognize this tort.' 8
However, it is uncertain whether this tort is viable in Illinois. As of
this writing, the Third and Fifth districts of the Illinois Appellate Court
have recognized this tort,' 9 while the first and fourth districts of the
Illinois Appellate Court have not expressly recognized the tort of
intrusion on seclusion. 20 Further, the Illinois Supreme Court has
expressly refrained from recognizing the tort.2'
11. See id. at 793-94.
12. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 239 (N.H. 1964).
13. See id. at 239-40.
14. See id. at 240.
15. See Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Estate of
Berthiaume, 365 A.2d at 794; Hamberger, 206 A.2d at 241-42.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
17. Id. § 652B cmt. a.
18. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 642 F. Supp.
1357, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("It should be said, however, that the tort of invasion of
privacy by intrusion is recognized in almost every state. It is generally accepted
common law.").
19. See Davis v. Temple, 673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1996)
(recognizing the tort of intrusion on the seclusion of another where plaintiffs sued a
police officer in his official capacity on seven different grounds); Melvin v. Burling,
490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (I11.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986) (holding that a cause of action for
invasion of privacy could be stated for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another where defendant used the mail system to intrude upon plaintiff's seclusion).
20. See Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (I11.App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1995) ("[W]e hold that the alleged actions here do not constitute an unreasonable
intrusion into the seclusion of another. We so hold without expressing a view as to the
appellate court conflict regarding the recognition of this cause of action."); Hall v.
InPhoto Surveillance Co., 649 N.E.2d 83, 85 (I11.App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995) (rejecting
intrusion on seclusion as a valid cause of action). As of this writing, the second district
of the Illinois Appellate Court has not had the occasion to consider the matter.
21. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (I11. 1989)
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This article provides an overview of the privacy tort of unreasonable
intrusion on another's seclusion. Part II examines the concept of
invasion of privacy.22 Part III briefly discusses the four branches of
the tort of invasion of privacy.2 3 Part IV outlines the elements of
unreasonable intrusion on another's seclusion.24 Part V reviews the
seminal Illinois intrusion cases and discusses their consequences.25
Finally, Part VI addresses whether Illinois courts should recognize the
tort, and ultimately advises all Illinois courts to recognize the tort of
unreasonable intrusion on another's seclusion.26
II. WHAT IS AN "INVASION OF PRIVACY"?

Compared to other areas of the law, the tort of invasion of privacy is
a relatively new development. In an 1890 law review article, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis proposed the concept of a right to privacy,
independent of the commonly recognized rights to property, contract,
reputation, and physical integrity. 27 They further argued that the
invasion of this right justified an independent tort remedy. 28 "Warren
and Brandeis are credited by most textwriters with seeding the thought
for the development of the invasion
of the right to privacy as an
29
independent and distinct tort.
At least two rationales for the tort of invasion of privacy exist.
First, an early and leading case, Pavesich v. New England Life
(finding it unnecessary to address the split of authority concerning the tort of intrusion
into the seclusion of another in this particular case, but concluding that the plaintiff's
complaint met the elements of another branch of the tort of invasion of privacy).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193-95 (1890). "Somewhat paradoxically, although Warren's and Brandeis'
primary object was 'to establish that the right of privacy was part of the existing
common law; in the process of searching for this right, they succeeded in inventing it."'
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 82 (W. Va. 1984).
28. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 205.
29. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976); accord 8 STUART M.
SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §30:2, at 855-56 (1991) ("[T]he Warren and
Brandeis article enjoys the unique distinction of having initiated and theoretically
outlined a new field of jurisprudence") (internal quotes omitted). The article has been
described as: "classic and famous," Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 240 (N.H.
1964); "perhaps the most influential article ever published in an American law journal,"
Crump, 320 S.E.2d at 81; and "the outstanding example of the influence of legal
periodicals upon the American law," William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,
383 (1960).
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Insurance Co., described the right of privacy as axiomatic and inherent
to humanity. 30 A reasonable person "recognizes at once that as to each
individual member of society there are matters private, and there are
matters public so far as the individual is concerned.'

A more utilitarian rationale for the tort also exists. Humanity's need
for privacy has increased as we have become more sensitive to
publicity due to the increased complexity and intensity of modern
civilization and the development of our spiritual awareness.
Technological advances in communication, however, have allowed
those who pander to commercialism and prurient, idle curiosity to
exploit the intimacies of private life. A legally enforceable right of
privacy is a proper protection against this type of encroachment.32
In 1939, the Restatement of Torts first recognized the right of
privacy.33 By 1952, a majority of American jurisdictions had
recognized this right.34 The First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court jumped on the bandwagon when it first recognized invasion of
privacy as an independent tort in 1952. 35 In 1970, the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized the tort, noting "[p]rivacy is one of the
sensitive and necessary human values and undeniably there are
circumstances under which it should enjoy the protection of law. 36
Today, only a handful of states fail to recognize a common law
cause of action for invasion of privacy. Some of those states
recognize the right solely through statutory law. In these states, the
statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy is usually more
narrow or limited than a common law action.37 Only one state has not
30. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).
3 1. Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 450 (Md. 1984) (quoting Pavesich,

50 S.E. at 69).
32. See Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 633 (Cal. 1952) (quoting 41 AM.

JUR. Privacy § 9 (1942)); see also Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d
633, 647 (Cal. 1994); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 196.
33. "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in
not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to
the other."

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).

34. See Gill, 239 P.2d at 632-33; Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 743
(I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1952); Lawrence, 475 A.2d. at 450 n.1; see also R.T.
Kimbrough, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 138 A.L.R. 22 passim (1942); R.T.
Kimbrough, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 168 A.L.R. 446 passim (1947); W.E.
Shipley, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 14 A.L.R.2d 750 passim (1950).

35. See Eick, 106 N.E.2d at 748.
36. Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (I11.1970).
37. See, e.g., Brown v. American Broad. Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1302-03 (4th Cir.
1983) (holding that an action for invasion of privacy was limited to the right created by
a Virginia statute so a common-law right of privacy would not be recognized in an action
arising from a television broadcast); Foretich v. Glamour, 741 F. Supp. 247, 250
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yet addressed the issue of a tortious right to privacy.38
Part of understanding what an invasion of privacy is requires first
understanding what it is not. While the United States Constitution
protects a right to privacy, this right differs from the common law right
to privacy recognized by state tort law.3 9 In tort law, "[t]he right of
privacy has been defined as the right to be let alone., 40 However, this
definition does not exist under the Federal Constitution where "there is
no broad legal or constitutional 'right to be let alone' by
government."'

(D.D.C. 1990) (holding that Virginia law does not recognize a "false light" invasion of
privacy in a defamation suit); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that the right of privacy in Massachusetts has a statutory
basis in an action for libel and invasion of privacy); Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d
666, 671 (Neb. 1989) (holding that expressions of pure opinion are protected by the
First Amendment and do not fall under Nebraska's statutory right of privacy); Howell v.
New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993) (recognizing that the right to
privacy is governed exclusively by New York statute as there is no common law right of
privacy in New York); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862-63 (R.I. 1997)
(noting that the tort of publication of private facts is governed by Rhode Island statute);
Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 554-55 (Wis. 1989) (citing the
Wisconsin statute which governs all fight to privacy claims).
In Oklahoma, the original statutory cause of action for appropriation of name or
likeness still exists in addition to the subsequently recognized common law invasion of
privacy action. See LeFlore v. Reflections of Tulsa, Inc., 708 P.2d 1068, 1074-75
(Okla. 1985) (recognizing both a statutory and common law right to privacy in a case
involving fraud and invasion of privacy in a beauty contest); McCormack v. Oklahoma
Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737, 739-40 (Okla. 1980) (holding that there is no statutory or
common law right to privacy when public records are used).
38. See Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1998)
(refusing to address whether a tort action exists in North Dakota for invasion of
privacy).
39. See McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir. 1976); ELLEN
ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 154-55 (1995).

40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1977). Judge Cooley coined the
phrase. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
849 (5th ed. 1984).
41. Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1521 (lth Cir. 1989). The court went on to
explain:
In the complex society in which we live, the action and nonaction of citizens
are subject to countless local, state, and federal laws and regulations. Bare
invocation of a right to be let alone is an appealing rhetorical device, but it
seldom advances legal inquiry, as the "right"-to the extent it exists-has no
meaning outside its application to specific activities. The Constitution does
protect citizens from government interference in many areas-speech,
religion, the security of the home. But the unconstrained right asserted by
appellant has no discernable bounds, and bears little resemblance to the
important but limited privacy rights recognized by our highest Court.
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Although the right of privacy is not explicit within the text of the
United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of "zones of privacy" inherent in the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments which deserve
federal protection.42 The constitutional right to privacy is limited to
restricting the government's power to regulate private conduct in
matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education.43 As for other areas of
privacy, the Court stated that "the protection of a person's generalright
to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of
the individual States." 44
Article I, Section 6, of the Illinois Constitution recognizes a right to
freedom from unreasonable invasions of privacy. 45 This state
constitutional guarantee, however, does not create a private cause of
action. Generally, constitutional guarantees, such as those found in
Article I, Section 6, only guarantee against abridgment by the
government and do not provide protection or redress against private
persons.46 Specifically, as to the state constitutional right against
unreasonable invasions of privacy, the framers of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution did not intend the provision to create a private cause of
action between individuals for invasions of privacy.47 In Illinois, the
42. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I;
IV, V, IX, and XIV.
43. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 712-13 (discussing the federal right to privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution); Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291, 299-300 (D. Conn. 1978)
(dismissing plaintiffs complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 after a discussion
of the federal constitutional protections); see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 39,
at 55-66; James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due
Process, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 117-18 (1996).
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (concluding that the
government's eavesdropping activities violated the petitioner's right to privacy)
(footnote omitted); accord Picou, 874 F.2d at 1521 (holding that a state statute requiring
motorcycle riders to wear helmets did not violate the constitutional right to privacy or
the right "to be let alone"); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 830-31 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that abortion protestors who publicized the fact that plaintiffs were
going to have abortions did violate the plaintiffs' right of privacy).
45. That section provides in part: "The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
46. See Barr v. Kelso-Bumett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356-57 (Ill. 1985).
47. See Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979)
(discussing proceedings of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention). But see Hill
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 641-44 (Cal. 1994) (stating that
in California, a constitutional guaranty of privacy was intended to protect against both
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tort of invasion of privacy exists and develops in the common law,
rather than by statute or constitutional provision.
III. THE FOUR BRANCHES
Although courts conceived the independent tort of invasion of
privacy around 1890, the tort's current formulation did not develop
until after 1960. In that year, William Prosser, Dean of the University
of California School of Law, published a law review article48 "[o]f
virtually equal significance in legal development" with the Warren and
Brandeis article.49 In his article, Prosser examines the tort of invasion
of privacy, asking "what interests are we protecting, and against what
conduct."5 ° He concludes that the tort is not merely one tort, but an
amalgam of four distinct torts.5
Prosser' s four-branch model of invasion of privacy was adopted in
Section 652A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (the "Second
Restatement"), and has been "adopted, often verbatim, by the vast
majority of American jurisdictions. 5 2 Under the four-branch model, a
person's right of privacy is invaded by: (1) an "unreasonable intrusion
on the seclusion of another"; (2) "appropriation of the other's name or
likeness"; (3) "unreasonable publicity" given to another's private life;
or (4) "publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public."53 Under any of the four branches, where a person
invades another's right of privacy, he or she is liable for the resulting
harm to the interests of the other person. 4

governmental and nongovernmental conduct and creates a cause of action for an
invasion thereof).
48. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 383.
49. 8 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 29, § 30:2, at 856. Prosser is regarded as the "major
influence" on the current formulation of the right to privacy. See Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 82 (W. Va. 1984).
50. Prosser, supra note 29, at 388.
5 1. See id. at 389. Prosser explained:
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different
interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an
interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge
Cooley, "to be let alone."
Id. (footnote omitted).
52. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269,
1278 (Nev. 1995), modified by, City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v.
Hecht, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (Nev. 1997).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
54. See id.
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These four types of invasion of privacy form "a complex of four
distinct wrongs, whose only relation to, one another is that each
involves interference with the interest of the individual in leading, to
some reasonable extent, a secluded and private life."55 Prosser
emphasizes that these four types of invasion may be subject to
different rules: "[W]hen what is said as to any one of them is carried
over to 5another,
it may not be at all applicable, and confusion may
6
follow.
Prior to focusing on the unreasonable intrusion on another's
seclusion, brief mention should be made of the other three branches of
the tort of invasion of privacy: appropriation, public disclosure of
private facts, and false light in the public eye. Regarding
appropriation, the Second Restatement formulated: "One who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy."57 This
branch protects the interest of an individual in the exclusive use of his
or her own identity, in so far as the individual's name or likeness
represents that identity, and insofar as the use may benefit the
individual or others.5 This tort involves the plaintiff's name as a
symbol of identity, and not as a mere name.5 9 No one has an
exclusive right to the use of a name; anyone can be given or assume
any name he or she likes.' The defendant becomes liable only when
he uses a plaintiff's "name to pirate the plaintiff's identity" for his own
advantage.6
Regarding the public disclosure of private facts, the Second
Restatement assigns liability if: (1) the matter is disclosed to the public
at large and not merely to an individual or a small group;62 (2) the
matter is composed of private-rather than public-facts; 63 (3) the
55. Id. § 652A cmt. b.
56. Prosser, supra note 29, at 389. Prosser's four-branch model has its critics. At
least one scholar has opined that it "overparticularizes common law developments,
reducing them . . . to a misleading semblance of statutory precision. This threatens to
stultify common law growth. The potential for further generalization from basic
principles may be limited by excessive deference to the specific terms of the
Restatement provisions." 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9.6, at 633
n.3 (2d ed. 1986).
5 7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C.
58. See id. § 652C cmt. a.
59. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 117, at 852.

60. See id.
61. Id. (explaining what constitutes an appropriation of an identity); see also
Prosser, supra note 29, at 401-07; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmts. c, d.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. a.
63. See id. § 652D cmt. b.
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publicity is highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable person;' and
(4) the matter is not of legitimate public concern.65
Regarding false light in the public eye, the Second Restatement
provides that a defendant who publicizes a matter concerning a plaintiff
that places him before the public in a false light is liable to the plaintiff
for invasion of privacy if: "(a) the false light in which the [plaintiff]
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b)
the [defendant] had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
[plaintiff] would be placed." 66
This tort protects the interest of an individual in not being made to
appear before the public in a false light or false position.67 In many
cases, a defamation action would also be available. 68 However, it is
not necessary for this privacy tort that the plaintiff be defamed.6 9
Rather, it is sufficient that the plaintiff is given unreasonable and
highly objectionable publicity that attributes to the plaintiff
characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that are false-placing the plaintiff
before the public in a false position."
IV.

UNREASONABLE INTRUSION ON ANOTHER'S SECLUSION

The gravamen of the tort of unreasonable intrusion on another's
seclusion is the invasion into a private place or a private seclusion that
the plaintiff has constructed around himself.7' Intrusion into one's
solitude, seclusion, or private affairs "constitutes a basic and intrinsic
infringement and invasion of the right to be let alone, and is a classic
example of a tortious violation of the right to privacy."72 Indeed,
solitude is "the core of true privacy,"73 and the intrusion branch "is at
the heart of privacy law."74
64. See id. § 652D cmt. c.
65. See id. § 652D cmt. d
66. Id. § 652E. See generally KEETON, supra note 40, § 117, at 864 (detailing
examples of this right of privacy).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
68. See id. § 652E cmt. b.
69. See id.
70. See id.; accord KEETON, supra note 40, § 117, at 864.
7 1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c.
72. 8 SPEISER, supra note 29, § 30:9, at 872.
73. 1 MICHAEL POLELLE & BRUCE OTTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW § 6.07, at 6-15 (2d ed.
1996).
74. Id. at 6, 14. "Undoubtedly, the tort, of intrusion ... illustrates more accurately
than the other privacy torts the right to be left alone and represents the purest form of
invasion." DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 2:1, at 16 (1991) (internal quotes
omitted).
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Liability for intrusion occurs when one intentionally and in an
unreasonable and highly offensive manner intrudes on the solitude of
another.75 The boundaries of this form of invasion of privacy are
77
quite established.76 Publicity is irrelevant to this type
78 of invasion.
liability.
to
defendant
the
subjects
The intrusion alone
Initially, there must be an intrusion, which can take any of several
79
The defendant can physically intrude into a place where the
forms.
plaintiff has secluded herself. 8° The defendant can intrude by spying
on plaintiff, such as by peeping, eavesdropping, or wiretapping.81
The defendant can also intrude into the plaintiff's private matters, such
as by opening personal mail, searching wallets or purses, or
examining plaintiff s bank accounts and other personal documents."
Further, the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.83 Mere noises, bad manners, harsh names, or insulting
gestures in public are not actionable.84 To establish that an intrusion
was objectively highly offensive, the evidence must show that the
intrusion would cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a
reasonable person.85
The determination of what is highly offensive to a reasonable person
is usually a question for the factfinder. A trial court, however, must
make a threshold determination of "offensiveness" in discerning the
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. As formulated by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." Id.
76. See 8 SPEISER, supra note 29, §30:9, at 874 ("The often quoted, approved and
followed Restatement Torts, 2d §652B (as well as numerous Comments and illustrations)
furnishes a strong underpinning of the law relating to tortious intrusion.").
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a.
78. See id. § 652B cmts. a, b.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. § 652B cmt. b.
83. See id. § 652B cmt. d.
84. See id.; Prosser, supra note 29, at 390-91.
85. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420-21 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(interpreting Pennsylvania and Florida law); Froelich v. Werbin, 548 P.2d 482, 485
(Kan. 1976) (obtaining sample of hair from hospital patient without permission in an
unobtrusive manner did not constitute a highly offensive intrusion); DeAngelo v.
Fortney, 515 A.2d 594, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding business solicitations from
two contractors inoffensive). The third and fifth districts of the Illinois Appellate Court
also require such evidence. See Davis v. Temple, 673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1996) (citing Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (I11. App. Ct. 3rd
Dist. 1986) (explaining that intrusion must cause anguish and suffering)).
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existence of a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion.86 In
making this determination, the court should consider all of the
circumstances, including "the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct
and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder's
motives and objectives, the setting into which 87he intrudes, and the
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.
In addition, the intrusion must be into something that is considered
private." Thus, there is no liability for examining a public record
concerning the plaintiff, or documents that the plaintiff is required to
keep and make available for public inspection. Further, a plaintiff
has no general right to be let alone on a public street or in any other
public place, since plaintiff is not in seclusion and plaintiff's
appearance is open to the public eye. 90 Therefore, there is no liability
for observing or even photographing plaintiff in a public place. 9'
However, even in a public place, there may be some matters that a
plaintiff does not exhibit to the public, such as the plaintiff's
underwear or the lack thereof. Accordingly, an invasion of privacy
may result from an intrusion upon such a matter. 92
V. INTRUSION BRANCH IN ILLINOIS

The foregoing discussion reveals how the unreasonable intrusion on
another's seclusion is a central aspect of invasion of privacy. The
great majority of jurisdictions have recognized Prosser's formulation
of this tort, which is embodied in Section 652B of the Second
Restatement. Despite such overwhelming acceptance of this tort, it is
not clear if intrusion on seclusion is recognized in Illinois. This
section will first review the seminal invasion of privacy cases in
86. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding television crew intruding into plaintiff's bedroom at a time of
vulnerability and confusion for plaintiff did constitute highly offensive conduct); Wolf
v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (D.C. 1989) (holding that using information from
public sources was permissible); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281-82 (Nev. 1995) (determining that trespassing into
hotel and filming plaintiff's animals without consent was not highly offensive); Stien
v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding
short video presentation poking fun at sex and shown at Christmas party did not rise to
level of highly offensive).
87. Berosini, 895 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679); see also
Stien, 944 P.2d at 379.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.; see also Prosser, supra note 29, at 391-92.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c.
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Illinois involving intrusion on seclusion.9 3 The section will next
discuss the consequences of those cases.94
A.

The Intrusion Cases

In 1970, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized, without
delineating, the right to privacy in Leopold v. Levin.95 Although the
case was decided ten years after Prosser developed his four-branch
model, the case involved solely the issue of appropriation9 6and did not
discuss the other three branches of Prosser's formulation.
In 1976, the Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court decided the first
"post-Prosser" case involving unreasonable intrusion. In Bureau of
Credit Control v. Scott,97 the Bureau, a collection agency, sued Scott
for payment of a hospital bill.98 Scott counterclaimed, stating facts that
described abusive debt collection practices through repeated harassing
and threatening telephone calls to Scott at home and at work, including
telephone calls to each of Scott's parents. 9 9 Her counterclaim
specifically alleged invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion into
seclusion, publicity which placed her in a false light, and public
disclosure of private facts as well as intentional infliction of emotional
distress."° The trial court dismissed the entire counterclaim. 10 '
The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the counterclaim
stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.'1 2 The court, however, upheld the dismissal of the invasion
of privacy counts with one dissent."0 3 Citing prior cases, the court
held that Illinois recognized an invasion of privacy action only for
appropriation of a person'S name or likeness for commercial
purposes." ° Also, since Scott had a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court concluded: "[W]e see no need to create
93. See infra Part V.A.

94. See infra Part V.B.
1970) (recognizing that even though
95. Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill.
a right to privacy claim existed in Illinois, no right existed where likeness and name of
plaintiff were used in the public eye in association with a crime the plaintiff committed);
see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing common law right to privacy).
96. See Leopold, 259 N.E.2d at 253-54.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1976).
97. Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37 (Ill.
98. See id. at 38.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 39.
103. See id. at 40.
104. See id.
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additional remedies."105
Approximately one year later, the Fifth District Illinois Appellate
Court, in Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde10 6 also refrained from
recognizing the tort. 10 7 The bank brought a replevin suit against
Donald Tremunde and Glenn Brown, who were doing business as a
partnership.10 8 The bank obtained a writ of replevin to recover from
the partnership certain chattels in which the bank had a security
interest.0 9 Some of the partnership property was located on the
Brown farm."0 Although Glenn and his wife owned the farm, his
elderly parents lived there. One evening a county sheriff went to the
Brown farm to serve Glenn with the writ of replevin."' Since Glenn
did not live there, the sheriff explained the situation to the elder Brown
and left a copy of the writ with him." 2 Shortly after, a group of men
in trucks arrived and took cattle and equipment pursuant to the writ.'13
The elder Browns intervened in the replevin suit and counterclaimed, alleging an invasion of privacy by intrusion upon
seclusion." 4 At the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a
verdict in favor of the bank, finding that the elder Browns failed to
prove an action for invasion of privacy."'
The appellate court affirmed." 6 The court speculated that the
Illinois Supreme Court would recognize a privacy action for
upon seclusion if appropriate facts were
unreasonable intrusion
"alleged and proved."'" 7 However, the appellate court concluded that
the elder Browns had completely failed to provide sufficient evidence
for such a cause of action." 8 In this case, bank agents were acting
under authority of a lawful court order in loading the cattle and
equipment from plaintiff's farm onto trucks." 9 Even though this
process may have been noisy and disruptive, it did not constitute an
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1977).
Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 365 N.E.2d 295 (Ill.
See id. at 298.
See id. at 296.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 296-97.
id. at 298.
id.

118. See id.
119.

See id.
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unreasonable intrusion.1 20
Similarly, in Kelly v. Franco,2 ' the Illinois Appellate Court in the
First District upheld the dismissal of a complaint alleging invasion of
privacy by unreasonable intrusion into seclusion. 122 The court noted
that although Illinois "recognizes an action for invasion of privacy...
courts should proceed with caution in defining the limits of the right to
privacy.' ' 123 The court cited Prosser's four-branch model but did not
acknowledge that Prosser's formulation was embodied in the Second
Restatement. 124 The court noted that the Tremunde court did not find
an Illinois case that specifically upheld such an action. 125 The court
then relied on Scott in affirming the dismissal of the invasion of
privacy count of plaintiff's complaint and stated that: "The clear
implication in Scott is that in Illinois actions for invasions of privacy
are limited to use of an individual's name or likeness for commercial
purposes.' 26 In Kelly, the defendants telephoned the plaintiff's27
residence many times and hung up when the phone was answered.
Even though the court considered privacy cases from other
jurisdictions that enforced the cause of action, it found none similar to
28 As a result, the court chose not to extend the
the facts in Kelly.
129
holding in Scott.
In 1986, the Third District Illinois Appellate Court became the first
court of review in Illinois to recognize the tort of invasion of privacy
by intrusion on seclusion. In Melvin v. Burling,'3 ° the Melvins'
complaint alleged that Burling intentionally ordered numerous items in
their name without their consent, had the merchandise sent to them,
and then made demands for payment for the unordered
120. See id.
121. Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979).
122. See id. at 59.
123. Id. at 57. Prior to discussing the common law tort of invasion of privacy, the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Article I, Section 6, of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution creates a cause of action for invasion of privacy. See id. at 56-57; supra
notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing Article I, Section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution).
124. See Kelly, 391 N.E.2d at 57.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 57-58. The court also added: "Moreover, we believe that even if we were
to recognize a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another,
we would still conclude that the facts upon which plaintiffs rely are insufficient to
support that action." Id. at 58.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (11. App. Ct. 3d Dist 1986).
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merchandise.' 3' The Melvins claimed that Burling's acts constituted
an invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion on their seclusion or
.
solitude. 32
The trial court granted Burling's motion to dismiss,
finding that Illinois law only recognized an invasion of privacy based
on the appropriation of a person's name or likeness for commercial
purposes.33
The appellate court unanimously reversed."3 After reviewing Scott,
Tremunde, and Kelly, the court recognized a cause of action based on
unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another.'35 The court did
not read Scott as holding that an invasion of privacy action based on
intrusion on seclusion was nonexistent in Illinois. 136 Rather, the Scott
court did not reach "a substantive decision on the matter since it had
1 37
already reversed the trial court on the emotional distress count.'
Further, "the Kelly case represents
only an alternative holding based
' 38
Scott.'
of
view
on an incorrect
After acknowledging the existence of a cause of action for invasion
of privacy for the intrusion upon the seclusion in Illinois, 139 the
appellate court then considered whether the Melvins pled sufficient
facts to support the action. ° The court first outlined the requirements
for a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion on
seclusion.' 4' The plaintiff must allege: "(1) an unauthorized intrusion
or prying into the plaintiff's seclusion; (2) the intrusion must be
131. See id.at 1012.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1013. The court stated that it "must determine whether a cause of
action exists in Illinois for an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and,
if so, whether the plaintiffs in the instant case have sufficiently stated such a cause of
action in their complaint." Id. at 1012. Concerning the sufficiency of the complaints,
the Illinois Supreme Court has explained:
To pass muster [in state court] a complaint must state a cause of action in two
ways. First, it must be legally sufficient; it must set forth a legally recognized
claim as its avenue of recovery. When it fails to do this, there is no recourse at
law for the injury alleged, and the complaint must be dismissed. (citations
omitted). Second and unlike Federal practice, the complaint must be factually
sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized cause of action alleged. If it does not, the complaint must be dismissed.
People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 430 N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (Il. 1982)
(citations omitted).
135. See Melvin, 490 N.E.2d at 1013.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man; (3) the matter upon
which the intrusion occurs must be private; and (4) the intrusion [must
that the
cause] anguish and suffering." 142 The court concluded
43
Melvins pled sufficient facts to state a cause of action.1
In Lovgren v. Citizen's First National Bank of Princeton,144 the
Illinois Supreme Court noted the disagreement within the appellate
court but declined to definitively end it. 145 Lovgren obtained a second
mortgage on his farm from defendant bank, but then failed to meet his
financial obligations. The bank urged Lovgren to sell his farm, but he
refused. 146 Advertisements in local newspapers and circulated
handbills informed the public that Lovgren was selling his farm at a
public auction to be held on a certain date. 147 These advertisements
failed to mention that the bank had a mortgage on the property, or that
the auction was being held to satisfy Lovgren's debt. Moreover, the
bank had48 not begun mortgage foreclosure proceedings on the
property. 1
However, such a sale was never scheduled, and Lovgren neither
!49
knew nor consented to the placement of the advertisements.
Lovgren alleged that the defendant's advertisements caused him to
experience anguish and suffering and made it almost impossible to
obtain refinancing of his mortgage loan. 5 '
Lovgren brought an invasion of privacy action for unreasonable
intrusion on seclusion. 5 ' The trial court granted the bank's motion to
dismiss.' 52 The Third District Illinois Appellate Court reversed and
and that
remanded, holding that it recognized the tort in Melvin,
53
Lovgren had pled sufficient facts to support an action.
Disagreeing with the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court
found that Lovgren failed to state a cause of action for invasion of
privacy based on unreasonable intrusion on seclusion. 5 4 As a result,
142.

Id. at 1013-14.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 1014.
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 1989).
See id. at 988
See id.
See id.

148.
149.

See id.
See id.

150. See id.
151.
152.

See id.
See id.

153. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 520 N.E.2d 91, 92-93
(111. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988), vacated, 534 N.E.2d 987 (I11.1989).
154.

See Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 987-88.
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the supreme court vacated the appellate court's decision. The supreme
court found, however, that Lovgren did state a cause of action for
invasion of privacy based on false light.'55
The court reached this conclusion based on Section 652B of the
Second Restatement. 5 6 The court acknowledged Prosser's fourbranch model of invasion of privacy, which the Second Restatement
embodies.' 57 Examining Section 652B and the accompanying
comments, the court noted that the gravamen of the privacy tort of
intrusion on seclusion is "some type of highly offensive prying into
the physical boundaries or affairs of another person. The basis of the
tort is not publication or publicity. Rather, the core of this tort is the
offensive prying into the private domain of another."' 58 Turning to
Lovgren's complaint, the court concluded that the offense and the
harm caused by the offense were not the result of prying, but of
publication. ,'
After discussing the legal principles embodied in the Second
Restatement, and applying them to Lovgren's complaint, the court
16
expressly refrained from adopting those principles as Illinois law.
The supreme court concluded that although Lovgren's complaint did
not state a claim for the tort of unreasonable intrusion, it did satisfy the
elements of "publicity placing another person in a false light.' 6' The
court then discussed the privacy tort of false light and its elements, as
Prosser and the Second Restatement recognize, and adopted invasion
of privacy based on false light as Illinois law. 62
As in Lovgren, the First District Illinois Appellate Court has
continued to apply to complaints the Melvin court's four "elements" of
an invasion of privacy action for intrusion on seclusion without first

155. See id. at 987.
156. See id. at 988-89.
157. See id. at 988.
158.

Id. at 989 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmts a, b (1977)).

159. See id.
160. See id. The court stated:
We emphasize that our discussion of the tort of unreasonable intrusion into
the seclusion of another, as enunciated by the Restatement and by Prosser,
does not imply a recognition by this court of such a cause of action. We note
that there is a conflict among the Illinois appellate court districts as to
whether this cause of action should be recognized in this State. [citation
omitted.] We do not find it necessary, however, to resolve these differences in
this case.
Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 989-92.
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recognizing the cause of action. 163 In several cases, the court held
that those plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege the first element of that
test, which is an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's
seclusion. The court in those cases, however, did not specifically hold
that the cause of action actually exists in Illinois. 164
B. The Consequences
One result of the aforementioned cases is uncertainty as to the very
existence of the tort of intrusion on seclusion in Illinois. Local federal
courts particularly recognized this uncertainty.165 Another result of the
Illinois intrusion cases is that some Illinois Appellate Courts continue
to ascertain the existence of the tort. 16 6 In any event, local federal
courts should conclude that the tort is viable in Illinois.

163. See Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1995) ("As a preliminary matter, we note that a cause of action for intrusion into
seclusion has never been recognized explicitly by the Illinois Supreme Court."); Miller
v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990) (stating that the
defendant's actions did not "constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of
another"); Mucklow v. John Marshall Law Sch., 531 N.E.2d 941, 946 (I!. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1988) (holding that the student did not show a right to privacy with regard to his
student file and that he therefore failed to state a claim of "intrusion into seclusion").
The word "element" implies a recognized test. However, this test is apparently
hypothetical since the first district has not yet recognized the cause of action. See
Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353-54; Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 904; Mucklow, 531 N.E.2d at
946.
Indeed, one must remember that the Second Restatement formulation of intrusion on
Rather, the
seclusion, standing alone, does not constitute binding authority.
Restatements of the Law are merely persuasive secondary authority. A restatement on a
subject does not have the force of law until a court of appropriate jurisdiction or a
legislature adopts it. See J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 10-11, 428-31 (7th ed. 1998); James F. Byrne, Jr., Comment, Reevaluation
of the Restatement as a Source of Law in Arizona, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 1021, 1023-26
(1973).
164. See Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1354; Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 904; Mucklow, 531
N.E.2d at 946. Similarly, in Hall v. InPhoto Surveillance Co., 649 N.E.2d 83, 85 (Ill.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1995), which was an appeal from the entry of summary judgment in
favor of defendant, the court noted that "the supreme court has specifically declined to
settle the issue of whether the 'intrusion upon seclusion' tort is actionable in Illinois."
Id. The court stated that it need not determine whether it would continue to follow Bureau
of Credit Control v. Scott, which held that the cause is not actionable, "because, even if
it is, plaintiffs' claim fails because there is no proof to support the pleadings." Hall,
649 N.E.2d at 85.
165. See, e.g., Kelly v. Mercoid Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Owusu v. Grzyb, 749 F. Supp. 897, 907 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (both cases noting
disagreement among Illinois Appellate Court districts as to whether the tort exists).
166. See supra notes 131-44, 164-65 and accompanying text.
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In several jurisdictional contexts, federal district courts in Illinois
167
must apply Illinois substantive law to cases brought to their courts.
Those courts have needed to determine whether the tort of intrusion on
seclusion is actionable in Illinois. Illinois state courts' decisions,
however, have confused local federal courts in their attempts to find a
definitive answer.
In Ludemo v. Klein,168 the federal district court was presented with
this question. After discussing Lovgren, the court observed that the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision was "disquieting."'' 69 The supreme
court expressly declined to decide whether the tort of invasion of
privacy based on unreasonable invasion on seclusion existed in
Illinois. Yet, the supreme court held that the specific facts of Lovgren
did not meet the requirements for an unreasonable intrusion on
seclusion.17 ° Thus, the district court noted that the supreme court's
holding seems to recognize the tort's existence. 7 ' The district court
then held "that if forced to resolve this issue, the Illinois Supreme
167. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938) ("[I]t is settled, beyond question
that it is the Pennsylvania law which the federal courts . . . are bound to ascertain and
apply."); 19 CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4501, at 2 (2d

ed. 1996) (discussing the core of the Erie doctrine and stating that "the substantive law
to be applied by the federal courts in any case is state law .... " subject to
qualifications).
168. Ludemo v. Klein, 771 F. Supp. 260, 261 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
169. See id.
170. See id.
17 1. See id. Specifically, the court stated:
It is disquieting that a court can hold that certain acts do not meet the
requirements of a given cause of action and also deny that the cause of action
exists. If the cause of action does not exist, against what standards can a court
measure the party's actions? When the cause of action does not exist, then no
set of actions can be said to fit within that (uncognizable) claim for relief. The
Supreme Court, however, discussed whether the actions of the defendant in
Lovgren fit into this (hypothetical) cause of action. This is not to say a court
may never rule in the subjunctive mode, i.e., "were this to be the law, we would
still rule as we do." The problem here is that the "contours" of the tort are
simply not so well defined that the application of doctrine can be decided
hypothetically .

. .

. The problem here is complicated because the Supreme

Court did not speak in a hypothetical or subjunctive mode. It quite clearly
holds that certain conduct does not constitute unreasonable intrusion on
seclusion and then holds that it does not decide the question of whether the tort
exists. By denying that the court is reaching the issue, after having plainly
reached the merits of the issue, the court is coy. There is no principled
difference between recognizing the "contours" of the tort and recognizing the
tort in the way the Supreme Court did so in Lovgren.
Id.; see also 1 POLELLE, supra note 74, § 6.07, at 6-13 to 6-14 ("Somewhat surprisingly,
the Illinois Supreme Court then added 'We emphasize that our discussion of the tort of
unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another, as enunciated by the Restatement
and by Prosser, does not imply a recognition by this court of such a cause of action."').
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Court would hold that the tort exists."' 172
1 73
In contrast, the federal district court in Kelly v. Mercoid Corp.
could not ascertain whether the cause of action exists in Illinois. The
defendant manufacturer required its employees who handle open
mercury to submit to periodic physical examinations, including
urinalysis testing. 174 The plaintiff refused to submit to urinalysis
testing and was discharged. 175 The plaintiff alleged that this
requirement constituted an invasion of privacy by intrusion. 176 The
court could not conclude that the tort exists in Illinois and did not
speculate whether it would be recognized. 177 Since the plaintiff never
submitted to a urinalysis test, however, the court reasoned 1that
"she
78
has not, and cannot, demonstrate an unauthorized intrusion.'
Although it is unclear whether the tort of intrusion on seclusion
exists in Illinois, it is clear that the Illinois Appellate Courts continue to
deliberate the issue. The courts' careful consideration has resulted in
their growing recognition of the tort. This evolving jurisprudence
should guide local federal courts to conclude that the tort is viable in
Illinois.
In 1996, the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court, the court that
decided Tremunde,179 recognized the privacy tort of intrusion into
seclusion. 180 In Davis v. Temple, Davis's complaint presented an
invasion of privacy based on intrusion into seclusion.' 8 ' The appellate
court framed its analysis into two separate questions. First, did Davis
allege a recognized cause of action? 1Second,
did Davis allege
82
sufficient facts to state the cause of action?

172. Ludemo, 771 F. Supp. at 262; accord Amati v. Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998,
1010-11 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("The court is of the opinion that if Illinois courts were to
adopt [the tort of intrusion upon seclusion], they would also recognize a cause of action
as pled in this case"). The court in Ludemo concluded that the complaint stated a cause of
action for intrusion on seclusion. See Ludemo, 771 F. Supp. at 262.
173. Kelly v. Mercoid Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (N.D. I11.
1991).
174. See id. at 1249.
175. See id. at 1249-50.
176. See id. at 1256-57.
177. See id. at 1257. The court noted the disagreement between the Illinois
Appellate Court Districts as to whether the tort exists in Illinois, and that the Illinois
Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict. See id.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text (discussing the Tremunde
court's reluctance to recognize the "intrusion into seclusion" tort).
180. See Davis v. Temple, 673 N.E.2d 737, 742 (I11.
App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1996).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 742-44.
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The Davis court examined the Second Restatement, the supreme
court's discussion of the tort in Lovgren, and the history of the tort in
the Illinois Appellate Court.18 3 The Davis court concluded that it
should adopt the four-prong test outlined in Melvin for determining
whether a plaintiff states a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion
on seclusion. 84 Further, the court noted that nothing in the Illinois
Supreme Court decisions precluded this court from recognizing this
tort. Thus, the court expressly recognized the tort of unreasonable
intrusion on seclusion.1 85 Nonetheless, turning to the second issue in
its analysis, the Davis court held
that Davis did not allege sufficient
86
facts to state a cause of action.
This evolving jurisprudence should guide local federal courts to
conclude that the privacy tort of intrusion on seclusion is viable in
Illinois. When Illinois substantive law provides the rule of decision
for a local federal court, that court must decide the case as the Illinois
Supreme Court would decide it if that court were presented with that
issue. If no state statute or case law controls the issue, the local
federal court must "determine how the case would be decided if
presented today to the Supreme Court of Illinois."' 87
Further, where the Illinois Supreme Court has not directly
confronted an issue, "[i]ntermediate appellate court cases are useful but
not binding evidence of what the Illinois Supreme Court would do in a
183. See id.
184. See id. at 744.
185. See id. The court stated:
A review of this area of law leads us to adopt the four-pronged test set forth in
Melvin for determining whether a cause of action has been properly alleged for
intrusion upon seclusion. Nothing written by our supreme court on this area
of the law leads us to believe that such a cause of action should not be
recognized in Illinois. Therefore, after careful consideration, we expressly
recognize a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of
another.
Id.
186. See id.
187. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992). The court's duty
has been explained as follows:
In divining and applying the law of the forum state in diversity of citizenship
cases, each federal court-whether it be a district court or an appellate courtfunctions as a proxy for the entire state court system, and therefore must apply
the substantive law that it conscientiously believes would have been applied
in the state court system, which includes the state appellate tribunals. In other
words, the federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the
highest court of the state would determine them, not necessarily (although
usually this will be the case) as they have been decided by other state courts in
the past.
19 WRIGHT, supra note 167, § 4507, at 126-30 (citations omitted).
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similar case."' 8 8 The local federal court must reach its decision based
on the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, 89the Illinois Appellate
Court, and other state courts on the same issue.
Based on these principles, a local federal court, if faced with this
question, should conclude that the tort of intrusion on seclusion is
viable in Illinois. Initially, the Illinois Supreme Court has expressly
recognized both the general tort right to privacy 9 ° and the Second
Restatement branch of false light.' 9' Additionally, examining the four
appellate court decisions on the question, the two decisions that
refused to recognize the tort are older (at least twenty years), 192 while
the two decisions that recognize the tort are more recent. 3 Also, most
American jurisdictions have adopted Prosser's four-branch model
formulated in the Second Restatement. 194 From this weight of
authority, it is logical to conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court

188. Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Ins. Co., 806 F.2d 759, 761 (7th Cir. 1986). When
a case involves unresolved questions of state law, the court is forced to look elsewhere to
resolve the issue. For example, the Green court stated:
If the forum state's highest court has not ruled on a particular issue, the
decisions of the intermediate appellate court or courts of that state constitute
the next best indicia of what state law is and normally should be followed by a
federal court sitting in that state ....
Although these decisions must be given
proper respect and cannot be disregarded simply because the federal court finds
them unsound, state intermediate appellate courts can be wrong in a sense in
which the highest court of a state cannot be in error. And, it must be
remembered, a federal court has a duty to determine state law as it believes the
state high court would. Thus, intermediate appellate court decisions may be
disregarded if the federal court is convinced by other persuasive data that the
highest court of the forum state would decide the matter in a different fashion.
19 WRIGHT, supra note 168, § 4507, at 150-57 (citations omitted).
189. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 413 (quoting Brooks v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 791 F.2d
512, 514 (7th Cir. 1986)).
190. See Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. 1970) (holding that privacy is
a value that should enjoy the law's protection); see supra Part V.A and accompanying
text (discussing the evolution of the intrusion tort).
191. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 98990, 992 (I11.1989) (declining to end the debate over the existence of the intrusion into
seclusion tort, but finding a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on false light);
see supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (discussing how the tort invasion of
privacy based on false light sustains the argument that a tort exists for intrusion into
seclusion).
192. See Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54, 58 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979); Bureau of
Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1976).
193. See Davis v. Temple, 673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1996);
Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986).
194. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269,
1278 (Nev. 1995), modified by City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v.
Hecht, 940 P.2d 134 (Nev. 1997).
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should recognize the tort of inclusion into seclusion.' 95
VI. SHOULD THE TORT BE RECOGNIZED?

In appropriate cases, Illinois state courts should recognize the tort of
unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another. Courts in other
jurisdictions have recognized at least two justifications for the tort.
These rationales mirror those for the general concept of invasion of
privacy.
Some courts have declared as self-evident that the facts of particular
cases entitled plaintiffs to seclusion. 196 To some courts, the axiomatic
right to privacy in the form of intrusion on seclusion is "derived from
natural law."'

97

In other cases, courts found this axiomatic right by way of analogy.
In those cases, after discussing the general right to privacy, courts
noted that the defendants' conduct constituted criminal offenses.
Thus, it was self-evident that such conduct can be the grounds of a
civil suit. 98
Another justification for the tort of intrusion on seclusion is that it is
more utilitarian. For example, in a case involving a physical intrusion
into plaintiff's home with the intruder wearing a hidden microphone,
the court explained why the tort should be available:
195. See Ludemo v. Klein, 771 F. Supp. 260, 262 (N.D. Il1. 1991) ("We find that if
forced to resolve this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court would hold that the tort exists.");
accord Amati v. Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (N.D. 11. 1993) (discussing
reasons why the court should adopt the tort of intrusion upon seclusion).
196. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) (holding that the
plaintiff had a legal right to privacy).
197. Pritchett v. Board of Comm'rs of Knox County, 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. 1908). As
one court explained:
We approve the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy to instances of
intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which an
ordinary man in a plaintiff's position could reasonably expect that the
particular defendant should be excluded. Just as the Fourth Amendment has
expanded to protect citizens from government intrusions where intrusion is
not reasonably expected, so should tort law protect citizens from other
citizens. The protection should not turn exclusively on the question of
whether the intrusion involves a technical trespass under the law of property.
The common law, like the Fourth Amendment, should "protect people, not
places."
Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted) (interpreting
District of Columbia law).
198. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931) (discussing how
common-law eavesdropping gives rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy);
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716, 718 (La. Ct. App. 1956)
(discussing how a plaintiff has a cause of action for invasion of privacy when he or she
shows that a defendant may have violated a "Peeping Tom" statute).
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To maintain the right of privacy and the right to be let alone is
rapidly becoming more difficult. Already there are devices
which may record the most secret and confidential conversations
from substantial distances without entry on the premises and
without any kind of equipment on such premises. There can be
no peace if neighbors and friends, as well as enemies, vicariously
join in the confidential discussions occurring in home, office,
and places not open to the public. Merely knowing what your
neighbor thinks about you may generate thoughts of mayhem,
if not murder.' 99
As Prosser recognized, the privacy tort of unreasonable intrusion on
another's seclusion protects a primarily mental interest. "It has been
useful chiefly to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the
intentional infliction of mental distress, and whatever remedies there
may be for the invasion of constitutional rights."2" Since Illinois law
clearly recognizes the other three branches of the tort of invasion of
privacy, 0 1 Illinois courts should recognize the branch of intrusion on
seclusion. "The desire for privacy illustrated by these examples is a
mysterious but deep fact about human20 2personality. It deserves and in
our society receives legal protection.,
VII. CONCLUSION
There are relatively few reported decisions in which plaintiffs
successfully asserted claims based on unreasonable intrusion on
seclusion. 2 3 Nonetheless, the bench and the bar should be familiar
with this form of invasion of privacy. The interest that this tort
protects runs deep in the human heart and resides at the core of the tort
199. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 932 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd, 449
F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). Speaking of such electronic eavesdropping, a local federal
court similarly reasoned: "In plain language, it ruins the privacy. One would never
obtain the full benefits accorded to a private place if he or she reasonably believed
someone would or could be listening." Amati, 829 F. Supp. at 1010.
200. Prosser, supra note 29, at 392.
201. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ill. 1989)
(discussing invasion of privacy based on false light); Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d
250, 254 (Ill. 1970) (recognizing privacy generally); Beverly v. Reinert, 606 N.E.2d
621, 624-25 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1992) (discussing public disclosure of private facts);
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1952) (holding
the right of privacy can be violated by the appropriation of name or likeness).
202. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(interpreting Illinois law).
203. "[M]ost individuals not acting in some clearly identified official capacity do not
go into private homes without the consent of those living there; not only do widely held
notions of decency preclude it, but most individuals understand that to do so is either a
tort, a crime, or both." Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1986).
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right to privacy. In appropriate cases, Illinois courts should recognize
this cause of action.

